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There is a view of the growth of knowledge that likens it to climbing a tree. We make 
steady progress in our discoveries as we climb the trunk, but at some time we are forced to 
make a decision. The branches begin to divide, so which will we take, which is most likely to 
lead us onwards in the quest for truth?  As we climb further, decision follows decision as the 
main branch further divides and divides. Close to the top of the tree we survey the view and 
feel we have made tremendous progress.  But a haunting thought arises, what would have 
been the view and what might we have discovered if we had taken a different route, a 
different main branch and different sub-branches on our way up.  Would we have learnt more, 
and would the view from the top provide a more comprehensive panorama? 
In the Handbook of Moral Motivation, the editors have collected together an array of 
distinguished authors in the field of moral psychology and moral philosophy, all of whom 
have an interest, one way or another, in the question what forces us to act morally, how are 
we morally motivated? Teacher educators, not familiar with the history of moral psychology 
and Lawrence Kohlberg’s work, might wonder why the notion of “moral motivation” is so 
attractive to these climbers?  Well, it was largely procedural.  The issue of moral motivation, 
as Don Collins Reed points out (page 341), relates to the so-called “judgment-action gap, the 
gap between judging correctly the right thing to do and doing it” that arose within the 
Kohlbergian tradition. Kohlberg and the later neo-Kohlbergians such as James Rest, needed a 
way of bridging the dichotomy they observed between moral reasoning and moral action, and 
the notion of “moral motivation” seemed to provide just such a bridge. The premise of this 
handbook of moral motivation is that these distinguished authors have been climbing the 
optimum branches of the tree, in pursuing his or her own disciplinary approach to morality 
and its putative components.  But have they? 
The Introduction of the handbook, written by one of the editors Fritz Oser, tells the 
reader that there are currently “12 different models of moral motivation” (pages 7-24).  Most 
have a strong link to Kohlberg’s theory of moral judgment and the subsequent work of James 
Rest and his so-called Four Components Model of moral functioning, though some authors 
adopt Augusto Blasi’s concept of the “moral self” as the basis of their moral motivation 
models. One might expect an overall assessment of these different models, but Oser reveals 
that this was not the handbook’s aim.  Instead, his chapter attempts to “illustrate how all the 
dimensions [of moral motivation theory] could be brought together” by providing a tentative 
“global moral motivational model” (page 22). This kind of synthesising is not unusual in 
psychology.  However, those acquainted with the strictures of  “Ockham's razor”, which 
prohibits the multiplication of entities, may wonder why 12 models were necessary in the first 
place?  But, the existence of twelve models does at least indicate that the issue of “moral 
motivation” has attracted many researchers in the field.   
The contributions of philosophers Thomas Wren, Don Collins Reed, and Terence 
Lovat and psychologists Gerhard Minnameier, and Augusto Blasi considerably strengthen the 
handbook, because of the critical dimension they bring to their work. They are particularly 
wary of “naïve psychological realism” (page 28) and the mechanistic reductionist tradition in 
the field of moral psychology. Augusto Blasi, for example, whose notion of the “moral self” 
is cited by many other contributors, laments: “the moral process, in fact, is fragmented into 
many sub-functions, which then need to be coherently organised…. In other words, these 
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models are presented in such a way as if they were guided by a sort of mechanical rationality” 
(page 231). In a similar vein, Gerhard Minnameier is critical of the reductive approach taken 
by James Rest and neo-Kohlbergians. He claims that moral motivation in the form suggested 
by James Rest is an unnecessary ad-hoc fragment. He argues that “what is thought to be 
distinguished from moral judgment is proved to be indistinguishable from it” (page 74) and 
“the whole idea of moral motivation seems utterly flawed” (page 72).  Terence Lovat is 
similarly critical of a reductive approach and stresses the irreducibility of one’s self, noting 
that “self-knowing is central to motivation” (page 251), which he exemplifies by reference to 
Thomas More and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. The criticisms of these scholars regarding the notion 
of moral motivation are refreshing, but the readers need to be warned that a number of 
contributions by other authors within the handbook are subject to the criticisms these scholars 
raise.  In other words, despite the synthetic aim of the handbook in papering over differences, 
the cracks remain visible.  
Don Collins Reed’s chapter accurately identifies two other deep-seated problems in 
the study of moral motivation; the prevalent and seemingly irreconcilable dichotomy between 
rationalism and emotivism, and between acts of deliberate conscious judgment and pre-
conscious intuition. Reed notes that within the field of moral psychology, the importance of 
emotion in moral reasoning and the role of intuition have been brought to focus by Jonathan 
Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) and by the Dynamic Systems Approach (DSA) as 
outlined by Kim and Sankey in 2009. Reed’s observations have particular relevance for 
teacher educators, because, as I have noted elsewhere (Kim, 2013), the two dichotomies he 
identifies have been pervasive in the pedagogy adopted for “teacher training courses that aim 
to enhance students’ moral and ethical awareness and behaviour” (p. 13).  Reed’s main thesis 
is that these dichotomies can be overcome if we recognise that “what look like rival and 
incompatible accounts are accounts of different levels of person functioning” (page 359) and 
all of these levels are “essential for moral motivation for human flourishing” (page 353).  He 
also believes that the Dynamic Systems Approach could offer a non-reductionist account of 
moral motivation encompassing different levels of description.  Personally, I have my doubts 
that Reed’s synthetic aims can be realised, not least because in emphasising the role of 
emotion and intuition in morality, Haidt sets them against moral rationality.  Indeed, from a 
dynamic systems point of view, the cognitive developmental models of Kohlberg and Rest 
and Haidt’s social intuitionism are each founded on a flawed dichotomy between reason and 
emotion. 
The many readers of the Australian Journal of Teacher Education will find parts 6 
and 7 of the handbook particularly interesting. The contributors in these sections bring 
extensive outcomes from research conducted in the context of professional education, 
including teacher, dentistry, business, and military education. Many of these studies were 
premised on one of the models of moral motivation introduced in the previous parts of the 
handbook. Sharon Nodie Oja and Patricia Craig, and Elizabeth Campbell identify “collegial 
loyalty” (page 530) and “pressures to conform” (page 590) as one of the biggest hindrances to 
one’s motivation to pursue the right course of action within the practice of education. Oja and 
Craig illustrate how novice interns perceive and cope with this pressure. They conclude that 
elements of “reflective coaching”, “support and challenge” and “guided inquiry” can form a 
well-structured internship environment where entering professionals are encouraged to pursue 
ethical commitment (page 601).  As the book title intimates, these sections of the handbook 
are intended to demonstrate the application of theories and models to professional 
development and the practice of education. Some readers of AJTE may be unsettled by this 
‘theory into practice’ approach, as it seems to separate theory and practice, when in reality 
theory in education normally has practice in view and practice is inevitably impregnated with 
theories of one kind or another, even if they remain implicit. Nevertheless, there is much in 
these chapters that has relevance to teacher education as a spur to reflection, and will reward 
careful study. 
Overall, this handbook will be of considerable interest to those specialising in moral 
development and moral functioning theory, particularly in the Asia Pacific nations where the 
Kohlbergian approach remains strong in the context of education.  But it also has wider 
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appeal, if only because it allows readers to see where many established scholars in the field of 
moral theory are currently focusing their research energies.  But the thought returns, is the 
exploration of morality presented in the handbook situated primarily in just one part of the 
tree of moral theory, and is the focus on moral motivation a result of climbing up one main 
branch and its tributaries, ignoring other possible branches where the notion of moral 
motivation is unnecessary or irrelevant? And has the chosen route taken by these authors 
afforded the best possible vista, even though over the past half-century, or more, so much 
time and energy has gone into studying every available twig and leaf?  
As noted above, Reed’s chapter intimates at least two alternative approaches, the 
Social Intuitionist Model and the Dynamic Systems Approach, but these do not need a theory 
of moral motivation to bridge a perceived dichotomy between moral reasoning and moral 
action, because they do not see a dichotomy needing to be bridged. Haidt, as already noted, 
does away with moral reasoning, calling it a ‘delusion’ (Haidt, 2012, p.28); rationality, he 
claims, is always intuitive. The Dynamics Systems Approach accepts moral reasoning and 
moral intuition, emphasising the dynamic and multi-causal nature of morality, where thought 
and action are interwoven holistically one with another such that they cannot easily be 
separated. These alternatives provide two very different main branches up the tree, and the 
problem is that it is not easy for those who have gone up the cognitive developmental 
approach to step sideways to joint those on the other routes up.  They would need to come 
down the tree a good way before finding a safe footing to adjoining branches, and doing so 
would require abandoning the notion of moral motivation. So, to conclude, perhaps the main 
contribution of the handbook is to provide a rich and deeply interesting account of one 
theoretical approach to morality, but one senses it is more like reading a compendium of past 
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